During the '60s and the '70s, basically all software was Open Source and everyone was allowed to copy, modify and redistribute computer programs.
Introduction
In the early days of the computer industry, software was not regarded as a separate good: computer manufacturers supplied software for free. During the '60s and the '70s, all software was Open Source and everyone was allowed to copy, modify and redistribute computer programs.
When software ceased to be hardware-specific and the diffusion of computers took off, firms started to produce software independently from hardware and to protect their code through intellectual property rights (Hall, 2003) .
At present, a turnaround is taking place: individual programmers and even firms have started again to give away their code, releasing it to the Open Source community. The Open Source production mode is spreading across the software industry and, in some cases, it performs even better than the traditional proprietary one.
Although a growing body of literature is analysing Open Source software (OSS) issues, there is still lack of empirical data on the phenomenon. In particular, while empirical evidence is available on profiles and motivations of individual programmers, little is known about firms that enter the software industry by producing under the Open Source license scheme (Open Source firms). This paper is a contribution to fill this gap and focuses on the business models of these firms. We find significant heterogeneity among them; in particular, many agents supply both proprietary and Open Source software. We discuss possible explanatory hypotheses on this issue analysing how the characteristics of the Open Source production mode and of the demand for software shape the strategies of firms that entered the OSS field.
This analysis may contribute to the theory of diffusion of technological innovations under conditions of increasing returns to adoption. In particular, models in the tradition of path dependence and lock-in (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985) predict that the long run outcome is characterised by a single dominant technology, which, once established, prevents competing technologies to gain a foot in the market. According to this prediction, firms should either adopt (or switch to) the dominant technology or leave the market. Entry is allowed only with the winning technology. In the case of Open Source, software the dominant standard is represented by Microsoft-based software in the client side of the market. In the server side, the OSS Apache powers 67.43% of the Web sites but Microsoft IS is still holding out. Its market share is round 21%. Because OSS products are not compatible, in general, with commercial ones, they are at disadvantage in penetrating the market. In addition, customers are reluctant to give up proprietary software and switch to Open Source solutions because of the network externalities that shape the adoption of software goods. Still we observe a massive process of entry of new firms that challenge commercial software by offering Open Source-based products and services.
In several recent papers Dalle and Julien, 2003) it has been shown that the market dynamics may be characterised by more, not just one, dominant technologies and the coexistence with commercial software is claimed to be the most likely long-term outcome. This paper endeavours to explain the driving forces under the strategic options of firms that challenge the dominant standard represented by commercial software in the expectation that the final competitive equilibrium will not be represented by a single standard. The paper is organised as follows.
Section II describes the roots of the entry and the business models of commercial firms in the Open Source arena. Furthermore, it reports about the specificities of software demand with which Open Source firms must cope.
Section III describes the methodology of the survey that we took on Italian Open Source firms. The main characteristics of the sample are reported.
In Section IV, we use the data collected by the survey to validate a model that accounts for the decision of a firm to adopt a more or less oriented Open Source business model. Finally, we summarise the main conclusions of the paper.
Firms' business models in the Open Source field and the role of network externality
The Open Source paradigm has a long story behind it. The idea that exchange of software code among the developers improves the quality of programs through investigation an intense collective activity of, bug correction and re-use originated in the early days of the computer industry. After World War II, in the United States, the computer science departments of Universities and the research centres of large corporations, like the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (AI Lab) or the AT&T Bell Labs, were like programmer's paradise (Rosenberg, 2000) where software was shared.
However, the Seventies were the turning point on the way for the dominance of proprietary software.
Computer scientists at AT&T Bell Laboratories invented an operating system, UNIX, which, being crossplatform, could be implemented on all machines. Initially UNIX was freely available to the community of software developers, but soon AT&T recognised its commercial value, a price tag was put on it and intellectual property rights were established and enforced (Lerner, Tirole, 2002b) .
After this decision, the computer industry seemed to be fated towards a market structure dominated by firms strictly protecting their code through copyright, trade secret or even patents 2 , but in 1983, a researcher at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Richard Stallman, reacted against this situation. He established the Free Software Foundation to develop and disseminate a wide variety of software without license fees (Tirole, Lerner, 2002) and conceived a license scheme, the GNU General Public Licence (GPL); to prevent that cooperatively developed software could be turned into proprietary. Nowadays a large amount of software is released under the GPL, which has a persistent nature: every program that uses a piece of GPLed code has to be released under the GPL too. Moreover, this license grants the licensee with a large bundle of rights 3 .
These characteristics scared the firms, the myth that getting too close to GPLed software would cause proprietary software to be turned into GPLed software and lost for ever (Rosenberg, 2000) spread very quickly across the commercial world and restrained Free Software 4 diffusion.
In 1998, some leaders of the Open Source community endeavoured to put this right and set up the Open Source Initiative (OSI). They drafted a document, the Open Source Definition, containing the criteria that a software licence must meet to be labelled as Open Source (approved OSI). Several licences schemes less restrictive than GPL 5 were introduced. Moreover OSI recast the expression Free Software, chosen by Stallman, as Open Source. Firms, in fact, might have wrongly assumed that the term free implied no chance to make profit from the Open Source software while customers might have associated no "license fee" with "no product support" (Hecker, 2000) .
These measures turned out to be successful and commercial firms began to engage in Open Source activities 6 . At present, this process has been involving two groups of firms in the software industry: large 2 Economic theory states that the very cost structure of the software good leads to concentration (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) . Software is information and the production of information involves high fixed costs and negligible marginal costs. The whole mass of cost of a computer program is concentrated in its first copy, while reproduction costs are extremely low. As a consequence, the more copies are produced and sold, the more the high production cost of the first copy will be offset by the low cost of subsequent ones. 3 See the text of the GNU General Public License (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html).
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Authors are aware of the difference between Free Software and Open Source. Nevertheless the discussion of these difference is outside of the scope of the paper. In the following the two terms will be used as synonymous. (2002) for an exhaustive analysis on the incentives of large software companies to take part in the Open Source movement. 8 These companies typically target the mass market and the market for individual solutions both for individuals and firms. Moreover they often offer also Linux-related services such as consulting, integration, support and training (Wichmann, 2002 (Wichmann, 2002) . The critical factor in this case is not the sales volume but the availability of talented human capital. In conclusion, high industry fragmentation is a viable equilibrium.
Anyway, firms that choose to supply OSS product and services in choosing their business model should not leave out of consideration the direct and indirect network externalities that shape the demand for software goods (Church and Gandal, 1992) .
On one side, the utility that an agent derives from the adoption of a software package increases with the number of other agents using that package (direct network externalities, Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . Software users form a two way -virtual network (Economides, 1996) through which files, documentation and knowledge flow. The larger the network, the larger the incentive to join for potential adopters (Varian and Shapiro, 1999) . On the other side, there strong indirect externalities Saloner, 1986, 1987; David and Greenstein, 1990) . The decision to adopt a software good depends on the number of compatible 10 Some firms have endeavoured to offer services to the Open Source community in terms of marketplaces and organisation of conferences or meetings. Marketplaces aim at matching agents that need a specific software product or service (buyers) with Open Source developers (sellers). Up to now this business model has turned out to be very unsuccessful and no company …has become profitable so far (Wichmann, 2002) . The shortage of guarantees for the completion of the products typical to thr Open Source production mode scares the buyers while the sellers do not want applications, which, in turn, is an increasing function of software diffusion. In fact, the more a software is widespread the higher the incentives for software house and individual programmers to develop compatible applications.
Finally learning to use a software usually takes a lot of time and effort so the agents bear high switching costs when decide to replace a package with another one. As the typists of David's tale (1985) , who learnt to use QWERTY machines because most offices were endowed with them instead with DVORAK ones, software users are usually trained on widely adopted software solutions 11 and must bear high switching costs when shift to other programs.
In short, the probability to adopt a software increases with its installed base. The very early stages of the adoption process shape the whole diffusion path. When a product succeeds in achieving a critical mass of adopters, its market share becomes larger and larger and the market is going to be locked on this solution (Arthur, 1990; 1994) . for firms (Kuster et al., 2002) .
to pay for a service that the Internet network provides for free. For the same reason Open Source programmers are not willing to pay fees for information about conferences and meetings. 11 Given the widespread diffusion of proprietary software on the client side of the market, the switch to Open Source solutions implies high switching costs at an aggregate level. 12 It is worth to notice that Open Source Definition allows for double licensing.
Therefore, new entrants must decide whether to follow a hybrid business model, combining different types of licensing schemes, or a pure completely based on GPL-type schemes. Once they have adopted a hybrid model, an interesting question arises, i.e. the intra-firm diffusion of OSS solution, as the proportion between the two production modes.
Firms that adopt a hybrid business model are likely to be are heterogeneous with respect to the extent to which they mix the two production paradigms. This paper analyses what determines a weaker or a stronger orientation towards Open Source Software. Our research hypothesis is that the extent of the intra-firm diffusion of the Open Source Software depends not only on the economic, technological or social incentives that lay at the basis of the Open Source involvement of individual programmers but also on firms' beliefs on the role played by network externality phenomena. Therefore, that firms that attach a larger importance to the specificities of the software demand are likely to offer more proprietary products and vice versa. We test this hypothesis using the data of a large scale survey carried out Italian Open Source firms.
Methodology and sample description
Open Source Software is in many respects very challenging for economics scholars. It raises several key theoretical problems that deal with motivations of the developers, coordination within projects, and diffusion of a new technology under a dominant standard ). An increasing amount of theoretical studies have been addressing these issues, but there is still lack of empirical data. In particular, few empirical works explore how firms relate to the new paradigm. Moreover most researchers focus on the demand for Open Source Software by companies or public bodies 13 while few data are available on the supply side of the market that is on firms that supply Open Source based products and services. The studies on Open Source firms focus especially on the characteristics of their business models (Rosenberg 2000;  13 From February to May 2002, the Berlecon Research GmbH together with the International Institute of Infonomics (FLOSS Report, Wichmann, 2002b) collected data on professional Open Source users in Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden in order to study their attitude towards OSS, the motivations leading to its adoption and the benefits coming from its use. 395 operators were interviewed in detail. It has been found that the extent of adoption of Open Source and its perceived benefits vary greatly depending on geographical areas, firm size and line of business. In Italy, Cogenio (2001) conducted a survey in order to investigate the use of Linux by small-and-medium-enterprises (SMEs). According to this study, 16 SMEs out of 414 use Linux on their servers whereas only one adopt it on the client-side, which is dominated by Windows with a share of about 90%. It is worth to notice that 80% of the interviewed system administrators declare that they are aware of Linux and the Open Source movement in general. Stability and security are the main motivations for the use of Linux on the server-side, while Windows is used on the Feller, Fitzgerald, 2002) , motivations of code releasing (Hawkins, 2002; Mustonen, 2002) , and licence choice (Lerner, Tirole, 2002b) . At present we are not aware of a comprehensive survey collecting data on the structural characteristics of these firms, their attitude towards the Open Source Software and their links with developers' community.
In order to fill this gap, during 2002, we submitted a large questionnaire to firms supplying, in various ways, Open Source solutions in Italy 14 . Sample selection was a critical task. Because of the novelty of the phenomenon, there is no complete directory of firms working with the Open Source Software and new firms are entering the field each year 15 . Specialised journals are publishing lists of these firms but they are partial or restricted to specific business or geographical area. Given that, we adopted the snowball sampling procedure. We approached a initial short list of firms and asked their collaboration in referring to other firms active in the Open Source field. We stopped when no new referral was originated. Clearly this amounts to say that our sample is not statistically representative of the universe but, given the exploratory nature of the study, this was considered methodologically correct. We succeeded in contacting 275 firms and obtained 146 valid answers representing a good cross-section of the Italian firms operating in the supply-side of the Open Source market. client-side especially because of its easiness of use. Moreover almost all Linux users on the server-side are in favour of its utilization also on the client-side. 14 The questionnaire consists of two parts. The former includes questions dealing with firm's characteristics. Variables such as year of foundation, size, entrepreneurs' competencies, products and services supplied are gathered. The latter explores firms' attitude towards the Open Source Software and its community as measured by perceived obstacles to OSS diffusion, incentives to choose of the new paradigm, number of OSS projects joined and coordinated, expectations about the evolution of the OSS market. The whole questionnaire collected more than 200 variables. Following the approach used in surveys taken on Open Source developers (Hertel et al., 2003) , we prepared the questionnaire on line: a Website was set up containing all the information about our study and the link to the data gathering system. In order to increase the response rate, announcements of the survey containing the link to the Website were posted on specialized portals and mailing lists. Moreover, we enabled the operators to take telephone interviews or to fill in and return the questionnaire by fax or e-mail. 15 According to our data, 59 firms out of 146 were born in 2002 
Heterogeneity in business models in the Open Source market: a model of Open Source intra-firm diffusion
The previous discussion highlights that Italian Open Source firms choose mainly hybrid business model and endeavour to profit from both the two production paradigms. In this section, we look deeply into the factors that affect the firms' choice of mixing proprietary and Open Source production modes. We argue that the adoption of a more or less Open Source-oriented business model is rooted both in the appreciation of the Open Source software and in the awareness of the role played by network externality phenomena in shaping software demand. Our argument is that the specificities of the diffusion paths of software technologies are a key factor in leading firms to choose a hybrid business model.
In the following, we attempt to classify hybrid firms on the basis of their weaker or stronger Open Sourceorientation. Further, we endeavour to model firms' choice to adopt a more or less Open Source-oriented business model as the result of the interplay of: i) heterogeneity in motivations that lay at the basis of the choice of the Open Source paradigm, ii) different degrees of participation in Open Source projects and iii) different importance attached to network externality phenomena.
For the purpose of the analysis, we single out firms adopting a pure Open Source business model and exclude them from the sample. In order to identify the pure Open Source firms we have combined three variables: the share of turnover due to the provision of Open Source products and services (OSST01), the percentage of Open Source products on the total (%OSSP), firms' statement about the typologies of solutions provided to the customers (SOL_C) 27 . A firms is purely Open Source if it holds that OSST01=100%, %OSSP= 100% and provide only Open Source solutions. We single out 8 agents (about 5.5% of the sample). Although interesting under many respects, the analysis of the characteristics of this small group of firms is out of the scope of this paper that aims at determining the factors that carried firms to adopt hybrid model chosen and, as a macro result, lead to the coexistence of two technological paradigms in the software industry.
To go further ahead with out analysis we group the rest of the respondents (hybrid firms, 138 out of 146 firms) through hierarchical cluster analysis 28 using a set of variables that e. Habits towards the use of GPL (LICENSE). We mean both the licenses under which firms distribute their software and the ones used to carry on the production process. This variable is coded 3 if the firm uses only the GPL, 2 if the firm uses it together with other Open Source licenses, and 1 if firm does not use GPL.
All the variables but the last one do not pose interpretation problem but we must explain why we chose GPL use as a proxy of the OSS focus. On one side GPL is the flag of the Open Source movement that answers for the survival of this new production paradigm. Its persistent nature assures that community developed code will never be hijacked and turned into proprietary. Keeping the code open preserves developers' incentives to write valuable software in order to gain reputation among peers and signal their talent to software houses (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) . A firm that choose to work with GPLed code shows it agrees with the knowledge sharing values of the OSS community. On the other side, a firm that inserts even a single one line of GPLed code in a program must release the whole software under the GPL. Given that empirical analyses show that 27 Exclusively Open Source solutions (SOL_C=3), mainly Open Source solutions (SOL_C=2) and indifferently proprietary and Open Source solutions. 28 An application of the cluster analysis for classifying firms is in Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2001) while Von Hippel and Franke (2003) use this technique for exploring heterogeneity of the user needs in the field of the Apache security software. We chose hierarchical cluster analysis instead of partitioning because we preferred not to fix a priori the number of cluster. Moreover it is more appropriate when the number of observations is smaller than 200 (Everit, 1993) .
the GPL is the most widespread of the Open Source licenses 29 , its use is indicative of the exploit of the code developed by the OSS community.
As expected, the five variables are correlated 30 , so we run a principal component analysis (PCA1) to derive the factors to be included in the cluster analysis. It is worth to notice that two components are extracted from the data, meaning that the heterogeneity in the sub-sample of hybrid firms, as measured by the selected variables, has two different dimensions (see table 2A of the Appendix). Our interpretation of the results is that the use of the GPL is not related in any way with firms' Open Source orientation, given that LICENSE is the only variable significantly correlated with the second factor extracted. The first component is, indeed, positively and significantly correlated with all the variables but LICENSE. This leads to the conclusion that the most reliable indicator of firms' focus on Open Source technologies is the first factor extracted by PCA, whereas GPL use seems to be independent of the firms' strategic choices. Different explanations of this result are possible. First, the use of GPL might answer the purpose of signalling to the Open Source community that the firm agrees with its value. Such behaviour aims at obtaining feedbacks and contributions from developers, independently of the true firms' market behaviour. Further, the persistent nature of GPL reduces firms' power to freely choose their preferred licensing scheme and force them to use this license scheme independently of any ideological consideration.
Cluster analysis is performed using the Average Linkage method 31 and reveals two distinct sub-groups. Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics of the two clusters, Mann-Whitney tests corroborate that the two clusters are well characterized, supporting the presence of significant differences between the variables in the two sub-groups. 29 On 12 th March 2004, the SourceFourge repository (http://sourceforge.net) numbered 77,026 registered projects. Almost 80% of them are released under the GPL. 30 Correlation matrix is reported in the Appendix (table 1A, table 2A, table 3A) . 31 Different aggregation methods are based on different measure of distance between observations and groups. In the Average Linkage Method the distance between two cluster is the average distance of all pairs of observations, one observation in the pair taken from the first cluster and the other from the second cluster. The application of other methods, would have produced a cluster including almost all the observations. It stands to reason that the firms in the former cluster (MOSS) are more Open Source-oriented than the firms in the latter one (LOSS).
More Open Source Oriented firms (MOSS) N=74
The literature on Open Source phenomenon Tirole, 2001, 2002a; Gosh et al., 2002; Dalle and David, 2003; Hertel et al., 2003) have explained the involvement of individual developers in Open Source activities on the basis of a set of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that resemble the ones that generate research efforts in the scientific community. So, a heavy Open Source programming activity has been mostly related to stronger motivations. However, tracing firm's decision to invest more or less massively in OSS only back to the motivational dimension and the subjective appreciation of the new paradigm does not fully account for the heterogeneity in the OSS business model. Namely, this approach overlooks the environment where Open Source firms do operate. The strong network externalities and lock-in effects that push forward the demand for proprietary solutions force firms to adapt their choices to market conditions and not give up proprietary technology. Consequently, the size of firms' investment in OSS depends also on firms'
perceptions of the strength of environmental obstacles to the diffusion of Open Source Software. Our research hypothesis is, indeed, that firms belong to the MOSS group not only because have a better appreciation of the OSS paradigm but also because they attach less importance to network externality obstacles to Open Source diffusion while the opposite happens for LOSS firms.
We test this hypothesis through a model of adoption of a more/less Open Source-oriented business model, that includes the following classes explanatory variables that turn out to be statistically different in the two groups ( . MOSS are more engaged in project activities. However these variables are prone to endogeneity. Project participation is indicative of a larger engagement in the movement but MOSS firms that bases their business model on the OSS paradigm is likely to be forced to participate in projects because it needs code developed within them. However we argue that involvement in Open Source projects is a key resource for young and small firms supplying Open Source solutions. Active participation in the 32 The taxonomy of motivations is as follows [Feller] : Economic motivations: because Open Source software allows small enterprises to afford innovation; because we want to be independent from the price and licensing policies of large software companies; because in the field of Open Source good IT specialists are easy to find; because opening our source code allows us to gain a reputation among our customers and competitors. Social motivations: because we agree with the values of the Open Source movement; because we want to place our source code and skills at the disposal of the Open Source community and hope that others will do the same; because we think that software should not to be a proprietary commodity. Technological motivations: because contributions and feedback from the Open Source community are very useful to fix bugs and improve our software; because of the reliability and quality of the Open Source software; because we want to study the code written by other programmers and use it for developing new programs and product; to obtain products not available on the proprietary software market.
community allows collecting information about products, services, customers and eventual openings of market niches. As a consequence having pursued in the past a strategy of active participation, is likely to be an important asset for firms, which allows and explains a larger adoption of Open Source technologies. As in the case of the variables measuring motivations, we check for linear correlations and apply a Principal
Component Analysis (PCA3) to overcome correlation problems (see table 6A We run a logit estimation, having coded the dependent variable as being 1 if the firm chooses a more Open
Source-oriented business model (MOSS) and 0 otherwise. Just as expected, participation to the community positively affects the probability that a firm will choose to invest more in Open Source Software. Both coefficients of CONTRIB and INV are positive and significant, meaning that having actively participated to community projects, both in terms of number of projects coordinated and lines of code contributed, allows for and sustains a more Open Source-oriented business model. This result are in line with our research hypothesis that participation to the Open Source community allows firms to gather information about market and technological opportunities in the OSS fields. Firms participating more to the OS community and taking advantage of this informative channel are more likely to be on the market with a more Open Source oriented business model.
As far as network externalities are concerned, our predictions are corroborated by the estimates: both WDP and MCA coefficients have the expected negative sign. Firms attaching lower importance to role played by direct and indirect externalities in restrain Open Source diffusion are more likely to focus their business model on the new production paradigm. Even though only the proxy measuring direct externalities turns out to be statistically significant, we find that the empirical evidence substantially supports the hypothesis that firm's choice of business model is also an adaptive strategy to software economies of scale on demand side.
Firms' aptitude towards the Open Source production mode, both in terms of motivation and participation to the community, are not the only determinants of firm's choice to adopt Open Source technologies.
Environmental conditions play an important role: namely, the idea that network externalities in the software demand is an important obstacle to the diffusion of OSS technology shape firm's strategy on the market. 
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